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Beach: Criminal Procedure - Capacity of an Individual to Validly Waive H

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Capacity of an Individual to Validly Waive His
Constitutional Right to Counsel and Privilege Against SelfIncrimination. Kennedy v. State, 422 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1967).

Defendant, Emma Breen Kennedy, had a history of
drinking since her teens, and had been known to drink for
two and three days duration. According to a psychiatrist
who testified at defendant's trial, during these sprees she
would develop an "irresponsible, don't care what happens
manner." On May 23, 1964, Mrs. Kennedy was on one of
these sprees. She had started drinking the evening of the
day preceding the shooting. Her indulgence continued the
next morning and that afternoon she went to a private club
in Rawlins. At approximately 4:00 p.m. the bartender at
the club refused to serve her for she was obviously intoxicated.
That evening, defendant was arrested by city police for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and she was
brought to the sheriff's office at 7:40 p.m. Mrs. Kennedy
could not walk a straight line at this time and the arresting
officer observed food scattered about the car and a half-pint
of whiskey lying on the back seat. Her speech at the time of
this arrest was loud and incoherent. At approximately 9:00
p.m. defendant's husband arived at the sheriff's office to
post bond for his wife, and they started to drive to their
home in Sinclair, approximately six miles distant. Upon
arriving at Sinclair, defendant climbed out of the car, supported herself and staggered into the house. Mrs. Kennedy
shoved a couch in front of the door and when her husband
attempted to push the door open she pointed a pistol at him
and warned him not to enter. Minutes later, after a neighbor
attempted to coax defendant into being reasonable, the defendant fatally wounded her husband. At 10:05 p.m. defendant
was again booked at the sheriff's office. According to the
testimony of the sheriff and his stenographer, defendant was
not intoxicated at this time and she walked perfectly well.
The sheriff asked Mrs. Kennedy if she wished to make a
statement pertaining to the incident and advised her that
she did not have to make a statement. She was also advised
that she was entitled to legal counsel. Mrs. Kennedy replied
that she would like to make a statement and the sheriff again
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advised her that she was entitled to counsel. Defendant's
statement was taken by the sheriff's stenographer in the jail
kitchen at 10:52 p.m. The trial court found that at the time
of waiving counsel and making the statement the defendant
was not intoxicated. She was thereafter convicted of murder
in the second degree. Defendant appealed, contending that
she was deprived of the right to counsel and that her written
confession was inadmissible as not being voluntarily given in
that she was without capacity to waive intelligently her constitutional privileges. The Wyoming Supreme Court in a
three-to-one decision held that defendant intelligently waived
her right to counsel and that the written confession was
voluntarily given after having been advised of her constitutional rights.'
The Court reached its conclusion after an extensive review of the facts relevant to the claim of intoxication. However, the specifics of the law of waiver and the required
capacity of an individual to effectively waive his rights were
not discussed. If defendant did not possess the required capacity to validly waive her rights then her Constitutional
guarantees of right to counsel and privilege against selfincrimination were violated.
Waiver had been defined as the voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right,2 the essential elements being
knowledge and intent.' To constitute a valid waiver, the
evidence must show that an accused was offered counsel but
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.4 Anything less does not constitute a valid waiver.' As a general
rule, courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against
waiver of a fundamental constitutional right,' and do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of such rights.7
Before an accused can intelligently and understandingly
waive a right he must, by necessity, be informed and advised
1. Kennedy v. State, 422 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1967).
2. Upper Columbia River Towing Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 313 F.2d 702, 706
(9th Cir. 1963); Matsuo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 824, 829 (9th
Cir. 1957).
3. 92 C.J.S. Waiver (1955).
4. Carnly v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
5. Id.
6. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 70 (1941). See also, Williams v. Green, 270 F. Supp. 977 (N.D.
Ohio, W.D. 1967).
7. People v. Carter, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614, 427 P.2d 214, 218 (1967).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/14

2

Beach: Criminal Procedure - Capacity of an Individual to Validly Waive H

1968

CASE NOTES

615

of the rights and privileges accorded him.8 The Supreme
Court of the United States in the well-known cases of Escobedo
0 set forth the warnings
v. Illinois' and Miranda v. Arizona"
required which are the prerequisites to a valid waiver and
to the admissibility of any statement made by an accused.1
Briefly, the necessary warnings which must be conveyed to a
defendant in accordance with the opinions are as follows:
(1) He must be clearly informed that he has the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation; (2) He must be warned of the right to remain
silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against
him; (3) He must also be advised that if he is an indigent a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him. As to this latter
warning, it need not be given to one known to have an attorney
or known to have ample funds to employ one, but if any
doubt 12exists as to financial ability the warning must be
given.
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible,'" and "there is not room for the contention that the
privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions
or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his
right to remain silent when interrogated.""' Facts, such as
lengthy interrogation and evidence that the accused was in
any manner threatened or tricked, show that one did not
validly or effectively waive his privileges."8
After the required warnings an express statement on
the accused's part that he will make a statement and does
not desire counsel, followed closely by a statement could
constitute waiver. 6 To determine in what particular situa8. 92 C.J.S. Waiver (1955); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People
v. Carter, supra note 7.
9. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10. See authorities cited supra note 8.
11. Escobedo and Miranda should apply only to cases where the trials have
begun after the decisions were announced, June 22, 1964, and June 13, 1966,
respectively. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966). However,
"the nonretroactivity of these decisions will not preclude persons whose
trials have already been completed from invoking the same safeguards as
part of the involuntariness claim." Johnson v. New Jersey, supra at 730.
Thus, Miranda is a factor to be considered in testing voluntariness of the
confession. See also Kennedy v. State, aupra note 1, at 95 (dissenting
opinion).
12. Miranda v. Arizona, aupra note 8, at 473 n.43.
13. Carnly v. Cochran, supra note 4, at 516.
14. Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 8, at 475.
15. Id. at 476.
16. Id. at 475.
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tions this will constitute waiver, all pertinent facts and circumstances of each case must be considered and evaluated."
One of the primary factors which must be considered by the
courts in the determination of waiver is the extent of the
accused's education and background."5 Other very important
factors under consideration include whether or not the accused
was under the influence of drugs,' 9 whether he was frightened,
hysterical, depressed, intoxicated" or sick.2 '
For convenience in evaluating the validity of waiver,
one author has classified defendants into three groups: the
fully competent, the marginal defendant, and the submarginal
defendant.2" Under these classifications, the fully competent
individual possesses a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the requisite facts to enable him to fully understand
the consequences of waiver, the marginal type is intelligent
enough to apprehend the consequences of waiver if advised,
but has no present knowledge of such consequences, and the
submarginal defendant lacks any ability to appreciate the
consequences of waiver. The author concludes:
The only type of defendant who should be permitted
to waive is the fully competent defendant, because
only he has the requisite knowledge and appreciation
of the consequences of waiver. The marginal defendant may be transformed by proper and effective
explanation into a fully competent defendant, but
until this transformation occurs he may not waive,
even though a "mature, intelligent individual" or
an "intelligent, mentally acute" person.28
17. Commonwealth v. Maroney, 246 Pa. 186, 231 A.2d 746, 747 (1967).
18. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where the Supreme Court took
notice of the illiteracy of the defendants involved; Adams v. United States
ex r'el, McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) where the court noted that the defendant had studied law, and was therefore capable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional privileges. Knowledge of the law because
of previous violations seems also to be taken into consideration. See Fullen
v. State, 283 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1960).
19. Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 185 A.2d 190 (1962). The defendant had
taken narcotics (heroin) within several hours prior to the confession but
the court held that the defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily
given. He appeared normal in all respects and gave answers involving
details as to dates and times.
20. Mundell v. State, 224 Md. 91, 223 A.2d 184 (1966). Defendant was advised
of his rights and was rational and coherent at the time the statement was
taken.
21. Cooper v. State, 1 Md. App. 190, 228 A.2d 840 (1967). See also Johnson v.
Zerbst, supra note 6, at 464: "The determination of whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused."
22. Comment, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1145 (1965).
28. Id.
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Applying the above legal principles to the facts of the
principal case, the issue is whether the defendant, apparently
afflicted with alcoholism and having consumed alcohol over
the lengthy period of time shown, at the time of the confession
had the capacity intelligently and understandingly to waive
the rights bestowed upon her by the Constitution of the United
States.2 4 Granting that the trier of facts found that defendant
was not intoxicated at the time of the alleged waivers, this
does not, of itself, render an accused capable of validly waiving his rights.
Drunkenness has never been an excuse for one accused of
a crime. However, it is recognized that the state of intoxication may be invoked to negative malice or deliberation on
the part of the accused.2" If intoxication may negative the
existence of specific intent, analagously it would seem probable that one afflicted with alcoholism who had been drinking
for such a considerable length of time would not possess the
required capacity to validly waive constitutional privileges.
At best it seems that such a person could be classified as
a marginal defendant, incapable at such time of being "transformed into a fully competent defendant."2 6 This would
appear to be especially true in light of the fact that Mrs.
Kennedy was only asked to give a statement pertaining to
the incident and was not told of her husband's death until
after the completion of the statement. Nor was Mrs. Kennedy
advised of her right to appointed counsel if she was indigent.
In conclusion, it seems highly improbable that the State's
evidence was sufficient to overcome the strong presumption
against waiver,27 and that the statement and waiver of counsel
proceeded "from the spontaneous suggestion of the party's
own mind, free from the influence of any disturbing cause." 8
This is not to say that one in such a situation as Mrs. Kennedy
could not validly waive her rights.2 9 If a defendant possesses
sufficient knowledge and understanding of the factual situa24. Kennedy v. State, supra note 1, at 97 (dissenting opinion).
25. See People v. Giullett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d 140 (1955). See also INBAU
& SOWLE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 395 (1960).
26. See supra note 22.
27. People v. Carter, supra note 7, at 218.
28. State v. Jones, 276 P.2d 445, 455 (Wyo. 1954).
29. Mundell v. State, supra note 20.
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tion, understands the consequences and is appraised of the
rights accorded him, only then can an accused intelligently
and knowingly waive his constitutional rights.
OTIS W. BEACH
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